Some of the split over the right to bear arms for purposes of self defense is an urban vs rural split. In this case rural may also extend to many suburbs in vast metroplexes.
Realistically or unrealistically many urban folks expect immediate access to goods and services. They also expect a higher level of services than people do in smaller towns or poorer communities.
In urban environments working and poverty class folks have lower expectations of prompt services than do more wealthy folks in better off neighborhood.
“When seconds count, the police are minutes away.”
Worse yet in way too many of these mass shootings there is a whole lot of dithering on the part of various teams of police. They seem to spend what amounts to a lot of time organizing before making entry, particularly when there are hostages and even when the hostages are being killed.
Getting the gun control folks to understand how the police are unable to provide instantaneous and universal protection will go a long way in awakening a lot of people to the strength of the argument for arming oneself for self defense.
From The Truth About Guns: http://www.thetruthaboutguns.com/2016/08/robert-farago/jon-wayne-taylor-what-went-wrong-with-the-police-response-to-the-orlando-pulse-nightclub-massacre/
Robert Farago
August 2, 2016
There’s a whole lot in the Washington Post article “They took too damn long: Inside the police response to the Orlando shooting, and there is a whole lot missing. Since it is not included in the article, I’ll skip over commenting on the initial police response. But even after that initial response, a huge, flashing, screaming, bright red light goes off in my head right here:
Police fired at Mateen when he popped his head out of one of the bathrooms. The shooter was outgunned and outnumbered. But then, police decided not to pursue him.
I don’t want to impune the bravery, or the judgment of the 10 officers responding at that time. According to their chief, these men followed their training. Given that, we have to take into question their training and the policies that back up that training.
To have a threat identified, and in this case to be in direct visual observation and actively firing at the threat, and then to back off that threat is a tactical error. A big one. I don’t know how to get past that.
By all accounts, they had numerical superiority, they had sufficient firepower, and a greater freedom of movement. Right then, when they could see an armed man they knew had killed people and there were people lying dead and dying all around them, that’s when they had to drive forward and stop the threat.
Instead, they allowed the enemy to reload and reposition. That was the critical error that resulted in an additional lose of life. People bled to death while they waited, and then the shooter killed more.
The Orlando Police chief says they didn’t enter and stopped firing because the situation became a “barricaded gunman situation,” and it was no longer an “active shooter situation.”
Was it an active shooter situation when he was running away from the police who were shooting at him? Was it an active shooter situation when his rifle jammed and he transitioned to his sidearm? Did it only become an active shooter situation again when he started to pull the trigger on his victims after a failed breach?
Continue reading at: http://www.thetruthaboutguns.com/2016/08/robert-farago/jon-wayne-taylor-what-went-wrong-with-the-police-response-to-the-orlando-pulse-nightclub-massacre/
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